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Abstract 
Most donors deliver aid in very similar ways across recipient countries even 
though recipients vary widely in the quality of their governance, commitment to 
strong development policies, degree of political stability, and level of institutional 
capacity.  Aid effectiveness could be improved if donor systems were designed to 
take into account key differences in recipient countries.  Proponents of country 
selectivity argue that donors should provide more aid to countries with better policies 
and stronger institutions because they are likely to achieve better results.  But 
country selectivity could be used to influence more than the amount of aid.  It could 
also influence the way aid is delivered, including the extent to which recipient 
countries set priorities and design activities, the mix of project versus program aid, 
the breadth of aid-financed activities, the length of donor commitments, and the 
distribution of aid to governments, NGOs, and other groups.  
Donors could employ a differentiated strategy for aid delivery based on a 
country’s quality of governance and commitment to development.  This approach 
would create incentives that would challenge recipients to strengthen institutions and 
policies. The pull or reward for demonstrating stronger governance would be greater 
national policy ownership, more flexible and attractive aid modalities, and larger, 
more predictable and longer term resource commitments. This approach differs 
significantly from traditional aid programs in which donors “push” countries to reform 
by negotiating aid disbursements in return for specific policy changes (sometimes 
known as “buying” reforms).   
This chapter considers what role pull instruments or challenge programs (such 
as the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Support Credits or the United States' 
Millennium Challenge Account) could play within the overall framework of foreign aid, 
asking how they could be designed to function as effective and efficient incentive 
instruments and how they could best complement other aid modalities. It looks first 
at how challenge programs differ from more conventional aid approaches, taking the 
Millennium Challenge Account as an example, and shows how challenge programs 
fall conceptually within the pull rather than push incentives type. It then develops an 
argument for differentiated aid strategies across countries based on key 





FROM PUSHING REFORMS TO PULLING REFORMS:  
THE ROLE OF CHALLENGE PROGRAMS IN FOREIGN AID POLICY 
Steve Radelet* 
This paper has been prepared as a chapter contribution to The New Public Finance: 
Responding to Global Challenges edited by Inge Kaul, et al. (Oxford University Press, 


















*Steve Radelet is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Global Development.  
http://www.cgdev.org 
  1 
Most donors deliver aid in very similar ways across recipient countries even 
though recipients vary widely in the quality of their governance, commitment to strong 
development policies, degree of political stability, and level of institutional capacity.  
This approach makes little sense. Aid effectiveness could be improved if donor systems 
were designed to take into account key differences in recipient countries. 
Proponents of country selectivity argue that donors should provide more aid to 
countries with better policies and stronger institutions because they are likely to achieve 
better results.
1 But country selectivity could be used to influence more than the amount of 
aid. It could also influence the way aid is delivered, including the extent to which 
recipient countries set priorities and design activities, the mix of project versus program 
aid, the breadth of aid-financed activities, the length of donor commitments, and the 
distribution of aid to governments, NGOs, and other groups. Donors could employ a 
differentiated strategy for aid delivery based on a country’s quality of governance and 
commitment to development, as follows:  
•  Strong-governance countries would have significant say in establishing aid priorities 
and designing assistance programs, receive much of their aid as program funding, and 
benefit from larger and longer term financial commitments.  
•  Weak-governance countries would have limited say in setting priorities and designing 
aid activities, receive more aid as project finance rather than program funding, have a 
larger share of aid channeled through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and 
receive smaller and shorter term aid commitments.  
•  Average-governance countries would receive aid based on a mixed set of delivery 
strategies along the various dimensions noted for the other two categories.  
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Donors should make the distinctions between these strategies very clear, and 
transparently assign recipient countries to receive aid through one of these channels.  This 
approach would create incentives that would challenge recipients to strengthen 
institutions and policies. The pull or reward for demonstrating stronger governance would 
be greater national policy ownership, more flexible and attractive aid modalities, and 
larger, more predictable and longer term resource commitments. This approach differs 
significantly from traditional aid programs in which donors “push” countries to reform by 
negotiating aid disbursements in return for specific policy changes (sometimes known as 
“buying” reforms).   
  Some donors are beginning to differentiate their aid strategies along these lines. 
The UK Department for International Development provides financing to support sector-
wide approaches in some countries, but not others.
2 The World Bank provides Poverty 
Reduction Support Credits to a small number of countries to finance their poverty 
reduction strategy and the associated social, institutional, and policy reforms.
3 Most 
recently, the United States has introduced the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), a 
new program intended to provide funding in innovative ways to a very select group of 
low-income developing countries that (according to a defined set of criteria discussed 
later in this chapter) demonstrate good governance and introduce sound development 
policies (www.mca.gov/about_overview.html).  
This chapter considers what role such pull instruments or challenge programs 
could play within the overall framework of foreign aid, asking how they could be 
designed to function as effective and efficient incentive instruments and how they could 
best complement other aid modalities. It looks first at how challenge programs differ 
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from more conventional aid approaches, taking the Millennium Challenge Account as an 
example, and shows how challenge programs fall conceptually within the pull rather than 
push incentives type. It then develops an argument for differentiated aid strategies across 
countries based on key characteristics of recipient countries.  
AN OVERVIEW OF THE MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT  
The Millennium Challenge Account is designed to provide substantial financing 
to a select group of low-income countries that are “ruling justly, investing in their people, 
and establishing economic freedom.”  The program could herald the biggest change in 
US foreign assistance policy since the Kennedy administration, both because of its size 
(proposed to eventually grow to $5 billion per year) and because of the way aid will be 
delivered (Radelet, 2003). Operations formally commenced in February 2004 with the 
creation of the new Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) to run the program. The 
idea is to select countries based on their demonstrated commitment to sound policies and 
good governance, give them more say in designing programs, provide them with larger 
sums of money, and hold them accountable for achieving results. Each of these four 
program dimensions is examined in turn and compared with conventional aid practices. 
Country selectivity 
The assessment and ranking of countries is based on 16 quantitative indicators 
drawn from publicly available databases (table 1). To qualify, a country must score above 
the median for low-income countries on half the indicators in each of the three 
categories—ruling justly, investing in people, establishing economic freedom—and it 
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must score above the median on corruption.
4 Thus, a country that does poorly on, say, 
trade policy or budget balances can still qualify on other indicators.  
The process is not entirely mechanical. The administration has limited flexibility 
to adjust the list of qualifying countries to take account of gaps, lags, and weaknesses in 
the imperfect data. In May 2004 the MCC chose16 qualifying countries for the first year: 
Armenia, Benin, Bolivia, Cape Verde, Georgia, Ghana, Honduras, Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Mali, Mongolia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Vanuatu (MCC 
2004b). In November it added one country – Morocco – for 2005. The number of 
qualifiers is expected to reach 20–25 countries by 2006.  
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Table 1. Eligibility criteria for the Millennium Challenge Account 
Indicator Source 
Ruling justly   
  1. Control of corruption  World Bank Institute 
  2. Rule of law   World Bank Institute 
  3. Voice and accountability   World Bank Institute 
  4. Government effectiveness   World Bank Institute 
  5. Civil liberties   Freedom House 
  6. Political rights   Freedom House 
Investing in people   
  7. Immunization rate (DPT and measles)  World Health Organization/World Bank 
  8. Primary education completion rate   World Bank/United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
  9. Public primary education spending/GDP  National sources 
  10. Public expenditure on health/GDP   National sources 
Ensuring economic freedom   
  11. Country credit rating  Institutional Investor 
  12. Inflation  International Monetary Fund 
  13. Regulatory quality   World Bank Institute 
  14. Budget deficit/GDP  National sources 
  15. Trade policy  Heritage Foundation 
  16. Days to start a business  World Bank 
Note: To qualify, countries must be above the median for countries in their income group on half the 
indicators in each of the three categories and above the median on corruption. 
Source: MCC 2004d. 
 
Many details of the selection process have been extensively debated, including the 
16 indicators and their sources, the use of the median cutoff, the focus on the level of the 
indicators rather than changes, and the insistence on achieving a corruption score above 
the median (Radelet 2003; Brainard and others 2003). There are important concerns 
about the quality of the data, and whether the process is biased against the poorest 
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countries, which would have difficulty scoring well on some of the indicators simply 
because of their poverty. Some observers see these indicators as an attempt by the U.S. 
government to push the “Washington Consensus.” However, since the Millennium 
Challenge Account includes indicators on immunization rates, school completion rates, 
and political rights, and excludes indicators on tax reform, privatization, and foreign 
direct investment, that criticism is off base.
5  Without repeating the details of these 
important debates, three key points about the selection process are worth emphasizing.  
First, by using a public, transparent methodology, the Millennium Challenge 
Account is aimed at depoliticizing the process of selecting countries. Political 
considerations will undoubtedly creep into eligibility and allocation decisions, but the 
public selection process will limit the extent to which this happens. In turn, this process 
should strengthen the focus of the program on growth and poverty reduction and on 
issues that recipient governments see as their highest priorities. 
Second, only a small number of countries will qualify each year. This is by 
design, to make the program more effective by concentrating resources where the US 
believes they can achieve strong results. Nevertheless, most low-income countries will 
not qualify. Thus, while the Millennium Challenge Account has the potential to be a 
strong program for the countries that qualify, it does little for dozens of other countries 
that will not qualify and so leaves large gaps in what is necessary for a more complete 
foreign assistance strategy.  
Third, qualification is based on policy and institutional changes that a country has 
already made, not on promises of future reforms. This makes the Millennium Challenge 
Account quite different from traditional conditionality-based aid in which donors 
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disburse funds contingent on the recipient implementing specific policy changes and 
promising more in the future. In effect, the Millennium Challenge Account is more a 
reward for sound policy choices than a downpayment on future reforms. Once a country 
qualifies and begins to receive funding, additional tranches are contingent on achieving 
specified results—such as distributing a targeted number of bednets or building a certain 
number of miles of roads. Basing continued funding on results is very different from 
using funds as an incentive to “buy” future policy reforms. 
The Millennium Challenge Account is not the only aid program that uses a 
quantitative process for selecting countries. The World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the African Development Bank have all adopted performance-based allocation 
systems for distributing concessional loans among eligible borrowers. In the World Bank 
a country’s allocation depends primarily on its Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment (CPIA) score, through which Bank staff rank countries on 20 different policy 
and institutional criteria (World Bank 2003a and 2003b; see also chapter 7 by Paul 
Collier in this volume). The Asian and African Development Banks use similar systems 
(ADB 2001; AfDB 2004).  
However, the Millennium Challenge Account differs from these other systems in 
several ways. First, its indicators determine eligibility, whereas performance-based 
allocation systems are used to determine funding allocations across many countries, 
almost all of them eligible for some funding. Second, the Millennium Challenge Account 
uses publicly available data for its indicators, while the other systems use confidential 
data based on the opinions of agency staff. Third, Millennium Challenge Account 
countries will not only receive more money, they will receive it in very different ways. 
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Country ownership and budget support 
Unlike most aid programs, in which donors take the lead role in shaping projects 
and proposals, the Millennium Challenge Account is intended to give recipient countries 
a much greater say in setting priorities and designing programs and to provide funds more 
flexibly. Guidelines issued by the MCC call for recipient countries to design their own 
programs and submit proposals for how they intend to use the funds (MCC 2004a). If 
proposals are approved the MCC and the recipient will enter into a three-year agreement 
that specifies how the funds will be used and what targets the recipient will try to 
achieve. Countries can apply for new funding when the agreement expires so long as they 
maintain their eligibility and achieve the specified targets.  
In giving recipient countries more say in defining priorities and designing 
programs, the Millennium Challenge Account resembles two other new and innovative 
aid delivery institutions: the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations and the 
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria.
6 Governments work closely with 
NGOs and the private sector to design programs that meet local needs and conditions and 
in which recipients have a large stake in ensuring success.  
Millennium Challenge Account countries are likely to have substantial latitude in 
deciding which activities to fund (say, for rural roads, water systems, or worker training). 
They will be expected to work with NGOs, private companies, faith-based organizations, 
and other groups to specify how proposed activities fit in with their poverty reduction 
strategies, the targets they expect to achieve, and the role of other donors in related 
activities. Some funding may be provided as budget support or to co-fund sector-wide 
approaches. The country ownership aspect of the Millennium Challenge Account is 
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inseparable from the country selectivity approach: the U.S. is willing to grant extensive 
flexibility only to countries with good governance and not to countries with weak 
governance, high levels of corruption, or poor policies. 
Scaling up 
For the countries that qualify, the Millennium Challenge Account could bring a 
significant scaling up of aid funds. According to its original design the program could 
reach $5 billion in funding by 2006, all of it to be disbursed as grants and fully additional 
to current assistance programs. This figure represents about a third of U.S. net official 
development assistance and about 7 percent of global net official development assistance 
in 2003 (OECD 2004). Only 20–25 countries are likely to qualify once the program 
reaches full speed, so the allocation to each country could be quite large. Radelet (2003) 
calculates that for a set of 20 countries that are reasonably likely to qualify, the additional 
funds would constitute about 6 percent of national income.  
There is considerable doubt, however, that MCA funding will ever reach $5 
billion. Growing U.S. budget deficits are leading lawmakers to begin to question the size 
of the Millennium Challenge Account. The administration requested $2.5 billion for the 
MCA in 2005 but Congress approved just $1.5 billion. But even at a more realistic $2.5 
or $3 billion a year, the Millennium Challenge Account would still represent significant 
new resources. 
The new funds may not be fully additional for the recipients, however, for two 
reasons. First, while Millennium Challenge Account countries will still be eligible to 
receive other forms of U.S. assistance, they will likely receive less of it. The U.S. Agency 
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for International Development will retain its presence in recipient countries, but is likely 
to focus on a more limited set of activities. Second, other donors may reduce their 
funding to Millennium Challenge Account countries. The extent of this substitution will 
not be fully evident for several years. 
Performance-based management 
The U.S. claims that the MCA will be performance-based, with the Corporation 
generously funding initiatives that achieve their goals and reducing or eliminating 
funding for those that do not. Of course, many donors make the same pledge, while few 
actually implement it. Again, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunizations and 
the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria are two exceptions. For the 
Millennium Challenge Account this will require collecting good baseline data, 
establishing measurable benchmarks, and implementing a strong monitoring and 
evaluation program, none of which are easy.  
CHALLENGE PROGRAMS: PUSH OR PULL? 
A fundamental difference between challenge programs and most other aid 
programs is the incentive structure for introducing policy and institutional reforms. 
Traditional aid programs are push instruments, in two related ways. First, donor agencies 
typically allocate a certain amount of funding for each country and then design projects 
and programs to meet that funding level. The amounts allocated at senior levels drive the 
process, rather than need or the quality of the proposed project.  
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Second, since the early 1980s donors have used aid funds to push countries to 
implement reforms that donors see as desirable for the recipient country, its region, or the 
world. Typically, donors negotiate policy reforms that will be implemented as conditions 
for receiving the aid, matching a schedule of reforms with a schedule of aid 
disbursements. Countries are required to implement some of these reforms before they 
receive any aid (sometimes called “prior actions” or “condition precedents”), and they 
pledge to make the remaining reforms in line with aid flows. Sometimes specific reforms 
are matched precisely with new disbursements in individual funding agreements (as with 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank loans); at other times they are matched 
with entire aid programs (as through policy reform pledges to annual donor consultative 
group meetings).  
The conditionality approach has not worked well (World Bank 1998; Collier 
1997; Burnside and Dollar 2000; Easterly 2001). Collier (1997) points out that there is 
little relationship between aid flows and changes in policy. Donors have at times 
repeatedly “bought” the same reforms from recipient countries, paying for reforms that 
never materialize or that are soon reversed. In Kenya, for example, the World Bank 
provided four agricultural adjustment loans during the 1980s and 1990s based on 
government promises to implement the same basic set of reforms. Each time the 
government implemented the reforms, took the aid, and reversed the reforms (Collier 
1997; Easterly 2001).  
The failure of conditionality-based aid does not mean that recipient countries 
never introduce promised policy reforms. Many countries do. Rather, there is no 
relationship between aid disbursements and countries following through with promised 
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policy changes: the evidence suggests that aid has played a very limited role as an 
incentive for countries to introduce reforms that they would otherwise not introduce. 
Countries reform when it is in their interest to do so, not otherwise. Aid disbursed as a 
quid pro quo for specific reforms plays only a minor role in shifting those interests and 
cannot significantly push countries into reform. This is especially the case if recipients 
see no real link between aid flows and the reforms, believing that they will receive the aid 
even if they do not implement the promised reforms. 
The Millennium Challenge Account and other similar challenge programs work 
more as a pull instrument through the country selectivity process. Countries must have 
already implemented good policies to become eligible, and aid flows are not tied to 
specific reforms. Countries must score high enough on a minimum number of pre-
established, publicly announced policy and institutional indicators to qualify. To be 
effective these standards should not be negotiated and should not differ across country 
groups (although they might differ between low income and middle income countries). 
Subsequent disbursements are tied to achieving specified targets directly related to the aid 
flows (building a certain number of miles of roads, for example) rather than broad policy 
reforms. Thus aid goes to countries that for their own reasons have introduced policy and 
institutional reforms, not to countries that only promise such reforms. 
The performance-based allocation systems used by the multilateral development 
banks share some of these characteristics. They tie the level of financing to a country’s 
rating on broad policy and institutional quality and not directly to promises of specific 
reforms. Thus, to some extent they are a pull instrument that rewards countries for 
previous policy choices. Most loans, however, continue to be tied to specific future policy 
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changes and thus act like push instruments. In these mixed aid programs a pull system 
determines overall country allocations, while individual loans under that cap push 
countries toward further reforms. Challenge programs such as the Millennium Challenge 
Account go further in the direction of a pull instrument by using indicators to determine 
eligibility and by tying disbursements to results rather than broad policy reforms.  
While challenge programs may be a new idea within the foreign aid context, they 
are an established modality nationally, notably within the philanthropic context. For 
example, the Kresge Foundation offers challenge grant programs for building facilities 
and purchasing scientific equipment.
7 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency offers 
challenge grants to nonprofit organizations to fund innovative solutions to specific 
environmental problems.
8 The U.S. Department of Education’s Technology Innovation 
Challenge Grants provide funding to low-income areas for technology-based education 
initiatives.
9 In Australia the Landcare Greenhouse Challenge program provides grants to 
farmers, community groups, and businesses for programs to reduce agricultural 
greenhouse emissions.
10  
These facilities designate funds for a particular purpose and then invite potential 
recipients to apply for funds—large or small—for activities that the recipients design and 
that are aimed at achieving the intended goals. Within the international cooperation 
domain, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria and the Global 
Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization are similar to these challenge grant programs.  
The Millennium Challenge Account goes beyond these programs and adds a 
further pull dimension by imposing strict eligibility requirements on potential recipients 
before they can apply for funding. Most other challenge grants do not restrict the 
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applicant pool by measuring the “quality” of the recipient. Potential Millennium 
Challenge Account recipients must already have introduced demonstrable policy reforms 
of a certain standard before applying for funding for programs that they design in 
accordance with their highest priorities. 
As a selectivity-based pull instrument the Millennium Challenge Account has 
many advantages, but its design also raises several important concerns. A critical issue is 
defining the eligibility criteria. There is considerable debate about just what policy and 
institutional conditions are necessary for aid to be effective and therefore what the 
eligibility requirements should be. Even with agreement on the indicators, weaknesses in 
the quality of the data lead to errors in measurement and inaccurate evaluations.  
Performance-based allocation systems have been at the center of similar debates, 
such as those over the content and weighting of the components of the World Bank’s 
CPIA scores. The same is true of private sector ratings systems, such as bond ratings by 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, or Institutional Investor, which use slightly different 
systems to rate the creditworthiness of countries. Thus, although it might be desirable for 
donors to agree on a single rating system for all their aid programs, reaching agreement 
on such a system would be very difficult. Donors will differ on how selective programs 
should be as well as on issues of content and weighting.  
Perhaps most important, selectivity-based programs by definition eliminate aid to 
countries that do not qualify. Taken to the extreme, selectivity-based aid would argue for 
halting aid to countries with weak policy and institutional environments.  However, 
recent research has shown that certain types of aid can be effective even in these settings 
(Clemens, Radelet, and Bhavnani, 2004). A more appropriate conclusion for selectivity-
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based aid is for donors to use different approaches in countries with weaker governance. 
In other words, donors could develop a more sophisticated toolkit with a range of 
approaches for delivering aid in different country circumstances. 
EXPANDING THE TOOLKIT: DIFFERENTIATING AID STRATEGIES ACROSS COUNTRIES 
The logic of the Millennium Challenge Account is that better governed countries 
should not only receive more aid but that they should receive it in ways that take 
advantage of their record of good governance. It takes the debate about country 
selectivity beyond simply reallocating funds to designing different aid delivery 
instruments for different kinds of countries. This suggests that challenge programs could 
be at one end of a continuum of aid instruments that vary roughly in line with the quality 
of governance. Donors could deliver different quantities of aid and deliver it differently 
depending on quality of governance and commitment to strong development policies.  
Varying aid delivery dimensions  
At least five dimensions of aid delivery can be adjusted through gradation and 
phasing to better match aid delivery strategies to country conditions.  
Recipient or donor control. Providing countries with more flexibility and 
ownership in determining national aid priorities makes sense in well-governed countries, 
but not in poorly governed ones. Countries with stronger governance could be given 
responsibility for setting broad priorities and designing aid-financed programs. This 
should start with designing poverty reduction strategies and move on to specific donor 
activities that grow out of that process. In weak, failing, and poorly governed countries, 
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where governments have shown little commitment to good development policy, donors 
should retain a strong role in setting priorities and designing activities.  
Program or project financing. Well-governed countries should receive a greater 
share of aid as programmatic or budget support, while poorly governed countries should 
receive primarily (or exclusively) project financing. Programmatic or budget support 
gives countries greater flexibility to use funds for their highest priority, adapt to changing 
needs, and finance recurrent as well as capital costs, as necessary. Budget support allows 
aid to be more consistent with the government’s development strategy (since the budget 
provides a blueprint for allocating public sector resources) and more readily integrated 
with government financial resources for development. Aid in this form tends to 
strengthen government financial institutions, whereas project support can weaken them 
by pulling resources away from budget systems to individual satellite projects.  
Well-governed countries could be given the discretion that comes with 
programmatic financing and budget support, so long as they have adequate financial 
systems (including regularly published budgets, appropriate accounting and auditing 
standards, and regular public monitoring) and are able to continue to show results. 
Donors could still provide some funds to these countries as project aid, but most aid 
should be in the form of program assistance or budget support.
11 
In poorly governed countries with high levels of corruption, opaque budget 
procedures, and poor monitoring and auditing, programmatic funding and budget support 
make little sense. Instead, donors should continue to direct their funds to well-defined 
projects that offer less discretion to recipient governments. Although project aid is 
partially fungible, it is less fungible than budget support, so donors can exert some 
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control. In poorly governed countries more aid could go through NGOs than through the 
government, which should also reduce fungibility. 
Delivery through central government or through local governments, NGOs, and 
civil society. In well-governed countries most donor assistance should be channeled 
through the government, while in poorly governed countries a larger share could go 
through NGOs and civil society groups. Aid to the central government can be more easily 
aligned with the government’s development strategy and better integrated into the budget. 
But not all aid should go though the central government, even in well-governed countries, 
since the government is unlikely to have the capacity to implement all worthwhile 
projects. Doing so could create a larger than desirable public sector and would reduce the 
possibility of providing aid effectively through other channels. For some donor-financed 
programs provincial and local governments can provide services effectively.  
In poorly governed countries more aid should go through NGOs or civil society 
groups, at least some of which may be more capable than the government to deliver basic 
social services to the poor. In countries with very weak governance, perhaps no aid 
should go through the government. While there is a possibility that a growing NGO 
sector will undermine government capacity building, governments in these countries have 
shown little commitment to strong development policies or little ability to use aid 
resources well. This approach permits more funds to be directed through institutions that 
can deliver stronger results.  
NGOs are not a panacea. Some are more effective than others, and some may be 
even less effective and more corrupt than governments. Donors must carefully assess the 
NGOs they work with and how they work with them. The important point is that the most 
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effective implementing partners for donors are likely to vary across countries, which 
should be recognized in donor strategies. 
Broader or narrower range of activities. In well-governed countries donors 
should support a broad range of activities consistent with programmatic and budget 
support. Donors could finance the poverty reduction strategy as a whole, including a wide 
array of activities in different sectors. This does not mean that everything can or should 
be funded. There is still a need to set priorities, perhaps with individual donors focusing 
on areas in which they have the strongest skills and experience. But donors as a group, 
working closely with the recipient government, should be thinking in terms of supporting 
a fully fledged development strategy rather than individual projects.  
In poorly governed countries donors should narrowly focus on specific targets of 
opportunity. In the weakest states that could be basic consumption or social services for 
the poor, while in slightly stronger countries support could broaden to sectors in which 
the government has shown some commitment and potential for progress.  
Longer or shorter term financial commitments. Donors should provide longer 
term financial commitments in well-governed countries than in poorly governed 
countries. Achieving development goals can take many years, even in well-governed 
countries. A country with an income of $300 per capita that records rapid economic 
growth per capita of 5 percent a year will take more than 30 years to reach a per capita 
income of $1,465, the historical cutoff for International Development Association 
eligibility.
12  
Aid funds are typically committed at most three years in advance—too short for 
planning purposes for many long-term investment projects in well-governed countries. In 
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well-governed countries donors should consider making commitments over a five-year 
time frame, contingent on countries achieving their short- and medium-run targets and 
otherwise continuing with good governance. Funds could taper off over time as per capita 
incomes rise and recipients gain access to private capital markets (see chapter 7 by 
Collier in this volume). In poorly governed countries, shorter commitments are 
appropriate, especially for funds going through the government.   
Linking assistance strategies with country characteristics 
Some countries fall between well-governed and poorly governed, and for them 
mixed strategies are appropriate. Thus donors might have three distinctive strategies to 
deliver aid to low-income countries based primarily on quality of governance (table 2). 
Countries with good governance. Donors could provide large amounts of 
financing to countries with good governance, predominately as budget support or 
program aid. Recipients could be given much of the responsibility to set priorities and 
design activities consistent with their own development strategies. Most of the aid would 
be channeled through the central government, which should take the lead in coordinating 
donors. Depending on the country, local and provincial governments and NGOs could 
also receive significant funding. Donors could focus less on micromanaging activities and 
more on measuring and achieving broad results. Donors could commit funding for five 
years or more, subject to the strict requirement that recipients show continued good 
governance and achieve reasonable results. The amount of funding could gradually 
decline as these economies grow and gain access to private capital markets.  
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Countries with average governance. Governments in countries with average 
governance could receive less funding than those in well-governed countries. Although 
recipients could play an active role in setting priorities and designing projects, donors 
could work to ensure broad-based participation and technical rigor. If used at all, budget 
and program support would be limited. Most funding could come in the form of well-
designed projects consistent with the country’s overall development strategy, focusing on 
activities to which the government has shown the strongest commitment and with the 
potential for progress. Financial commitments could be for three to five years, contingent 
on progress. A larger share of funding could go through NGOs or civil society groups 
than in well-governed countries. Project performance should be monitored carefully, with 
clear performance standards. Strong performance could lead to increased financial 
support and longer commitments, while weak results could lead to less aid. Donors must 
be prepared to reduce funding when agreed performance standards are not met. 
Countries with weak governance. Countries with weak governance must be dealt 
with on a case-by-case basis since circumstances vary widely—some are failed states, 
others are failing, while still others are weak or fragile. Bilateral aid is likely to be heavily 
influenced by strategic and security considerations. For example, the United States has 
expressed strong concern about failed states as part of the war on terrorism and has 
allocated substantial sums to weak states that are its allies in the war. Assistance to poorly 
governed countries could be tightly focused on humanitarian relief and basic services for 
the poor. Donors could focus on a limited set of high priority activities with the potential 
for demonstrating quick results to policymakers and the public, to help consolidate the 
reform process (World Bank 2001).  
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Donors could play a greater role in setting priorities and designing activities than 
in countries with strong governance. Program aid and budget support should be used 
rarely, if ever. Where governance is particularly weak, aid should be provided through 
NGOs and civil society groups rather than the government. The World Bank (2001) and 
Collier (2002) have suggested establishing independent service authorities to oversee the 
delivery of basic services.
13 Working in these countries is much riskier than working 
elsewhere. Programs in poorly governed states require careful monitoring, regular 
reappraisal, flexible responses as initiatives begin to work or fail, and a higher tolerance 
for failure. 
More pull than push 
With three distinctive, graduated approaches that vary along several dimensions, 
donors will be relying more on pull instruments and less on push strategies. Since the first 
of the three approaches outlined above is more attractive to recipients than the second, 
and the second is more attractive than the third, this framework provides strong 
incentives for recipients to take the steps necessary to become eligible for the more 
favorable approach. Whether a recipient moves from one category to the next will depend 
on the demonstrated quality of governance and policy, not on promises of further reform. 
Within each strategy continued funding could be based more on achieving results directly 
related to the funding (building a certain number of roads, increasing the immunization 
rate by a prescribed amount) and less on promises for broad policy reforms. To the extent 
that push instruments continue, donors will have to be more firm about reducing funding 
when promises remain unfulfilled. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
By and large donor programs have not differentiated their delivery instruments to 
countries based on good or bad policies or good or bad governance. Rather, donors have 
tied disbursements to promises for broad policy reforms in an attempt to push recipients 
to implement reforms that donors view as desirable.  
The Millennium Challenge Account breaks with practice on both of these 
important dimensions. It takes country selectivity much further than previous programs 
by establishing high qualification standards based on good governance and strong 
policies, providing large amounts of funding to the countries that qualify, and delivering 
the assistance more flexibly and efficiently. By identifying policy standards for entry to 
the program rather than tying aid disbursements to promises for specific policy reforms, 
the Millennium Challenge Account serves as a pull instrument for development. Well-
governed countries that have already introduced policies that will benefit their country 
and region are thus rewarded with larger and more flexible assistance flows. 
Challenge programs could be a first step toward designing distinct aid delivery 
approaches for different countries, depending on the quality of their governance and 
policy structure. Approaches could differ by size of flows, formulation as program 
(including budget support) or project support, the role of recipient countries in setting 
priorities and designing programs and projects, reliance on governments or NGOs as 
implementing partners, and other aspects. If the Millennium Challenge Account 
succeeds, other donors may establish their own challenge programs. Ideally, donors 
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would agree on the eligibility standards for such programs so that programs reinforced 
each other with a consistent message to recipients.  
More differentiated strategies would allow donors to tailor aid delivery 
instruments more closely to the strengths and weaknesses of recipient countries, making 
aid more efficient and effective. Such strategies would also introduce more of a pull 
structure across the continuum of aid delivery instruments, rewarding countries that have 
better policies and stronger governance with more flexible and larger amounts of aid, 
without tying the aid to specific reform measures.  
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Table 2. Three strategies for aid modalities and country governance 
Aid modality  Good governance  Average governance  Weak governance 
Amount of funding  Large  Average  Small 
Responsibility for setting priorities and 
designing projects and programs 
Mostly with recipients 
(country ownership)  Combined donor and recipient  Mostly with donors 
Program or project funding  Mainly program and budget 
support 
Primarily projects, but some program 
and budget support 
Almost entirely projects 
Breadth of funded activities  Broad—support full poverty 
reduction and development 
strategy 
Moderate—support areas with most 
promise for progress 
Narrow—look for specific 
opportunities where some 
progress is possible; focus on 
humanitarian relief and 
providing basic services 
Degree of donor flexibility  Most flexible  Limited flexibility  Very little flexibility 
Recipients  Mostly government, with 
some to NGOs and private 
sector 
Mix of government, NGO, and 
private sector 
Larger share to NGOs, with 
some to governments 
Length of donor commitment  Long (5 years or more)  Moderate (3–5 years)  Short (1 year) 
Monitoring and evaluation  Strong monitoring and 
evaluation with good baseline 
data; primarily focus on 
outputs and outcomes 
Strong monitoring and evaluation 
with good baseline data; focus on 
inputs as well as outputs and 
outcomes 
Strong monitoring and 
evaluation with good baseline 
data; very tight oversight and 
regular re-appraisal 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 The notion of country selectivity is based on research by Isham, Kaufmann, and Pritchett (1995), 
Burnside and Dollar (2000), and Collier and Dollar (2002) that indicates that aid has a stronger relationship 
with growth in countries with stronger policies and institutions. The robustness of the results of the latter 
two studies have recently been questioned, however (Easterly, Levine, and Roodman, 2004).  Clemens, 
Radelet, and Bhavnani (2004) find that subcategories of aid aimed primarily at growth have a positive 
impact on growth across all countries, but they find some evidence that the relationship is stronger in the 
presence of good institutions. 
The author thanks several anonymous referees for comments on an earlier draft and Sabeen 
Hassanali for her able research and other assistance. 
2 Under sector-wide approaches all significant government and donor funding for a sector supports 
a single sector policy and expenditure program, with the government leading the policymaking and 
implementation. Common approaches are adopted across the sector by all funding parties (government and 
donors), with increasing reliance on government procedures to disburse and account for donor funds 
(www.eldis.org/healthsystems/aid/#swaps). 
3 Available to eligible borrowers from the International Development Association (IDA), the 
Poverty Reduction Support Credit is a quick-disbursing lending instrument. So far Uganda, Vietnam, and 
Burkina Faso have been approved for such lending (www.worldbank.org/). 
4 For more detail on the qualification process, see Radelet (2003) and MCC (2004c, d).  
5 The “Washington consensus” is a term originally coined by John Williamson (1990) to 
summarize the set of 10 policy reforms that most of official Washington thought was the appropriate basis 
for reform in developing countries, including fiscal discipline, tax reform, trade and capital account 
liberalization, privatization and deregulation, and secure property rights. It has come to be used as a 
synonym for neoliberalism or market fundamentalism, although that was far from Williamson’s intent.  
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6 Brief descriptions of these mechanisms can be found in the Inventory at the end of this volume. 
7 See www.kresge.org/programs/index.htm. 
8 See www.epa.gov/ecocommunity/sdcg/. 
9 See www.ed.gov/programs/techinnov/index.html. 
10 See www.landcareaustralia.com.au/.  
11 Project aid has some practical advantages, even if it is inefficient. Overseers of donor budgets—
parliamentarians and members of congress—like to be able to connect at least some of their money to 
specific activities. Moreover, project aid is less susceptible than program aid to politicized charges that the 
money was diverted to something else (such as a presidential airplane), even though the fungibility of 
money means that in reality there may be little difference between the two modes. 
12 For 2005 in 2003 dollars (www.worldbank.org).  
13 Collier (2002) likens these to an expenditure-side version of an Independent Revenue Authority. 
He describes six features of the ISA, suggesting that it would:  
a)  Be autonomous from government with high standards of accountability to donors;  
b)  Have an incentive system for its staff which motivates them to achieve the objectives of the 
donors, i.e. in terms of health and education outcomes;  
c)  Act as a “wholesaler” through which donors would channel their funds to “retail” providers of 
services;  
d)  Contract with retail providers for a flow of services rather than pump-priming a project;  
e)  Serve as a channel for funds, ideally equivalent to prior levels of spending on the services it would 
provide; and, 
f)  Serve as a channel for all donor funding to the country for basic health care and primary 
education, or whatever it is providing. 
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